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Abstract
MOBILE is an extension of the .NET Common Intermediate Lan-
guage that permits certified In-Lined Reference Monitoring on Mi-
crosoft .NET architectures. MOBILE programs have the useful prop-
erty that if they are well-typed with respect to a declared security
policy, then they are guaranteed not to violate that security policy
when executed. Thus, when an In-Lined Reference Monitor (IRM) is
expressed in MOBILE, it can be certified by a simple type-checker to
eliminate the need to trust the producer of the IRM. MOBILE thereby
permits development of arbitrarily complex IRM producers without
contributing that added complexity to the trusted computing base of
the system.
Security policies in MOBILE are declarative, can involve poten-
tially unbounded collections of objects allocated at runtime, and can
regard finite- or infinite-length histories of security events exhibited
by those objects. Our prototype implementation of MOBILE enforces
properties expressed by finite-state security automata—one automa-
ton for each security-relevant object, and can type-check MOBILE
programs in the presence of exceptions, finalizers, concurrency, and
non-termination. Executing MOBILE programs requires no change to
existing .NET virtual machine implementations, since MOBILE pro-
grams consist of normal managed CIL code with extra typing annota-
tions stored in .NET attributes.
1 Introduction
Language-based approaches to computer security have employed two major
strategies for enforcing security policies over untrusted programs.
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from Intel Corporation. The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the
authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or
endorsements, either expressed or implied, of these organizations or the U.S. Government.
1
• Low-level type systems, such as those used in Java bytecode [16], .NET
CIL [5], and TAL for x86 [18], can enforce important program invari-
ants like memory safety and control safety, which dictate that pro-
grams must access and transfer control only to certain suitable mem-
ory addresses throughout their executions.
• Execution Monitoring technologies such as Java and .NET stack in-
spection [10] [16, II.22.11], SASI [7], Polymer [1], and Naccio [8], use
runtime checks to enforce temporal properties that can depend on the
history of the program’s execution. For example, SASI Java was used
to enforce the policy that no program may access the network after it
reads from a file [6]. For efficiency, execution monitors are often imple-
mented as In-lined Reference Monitors (IRM’s), wherein the runtime
checks are in-lined into the untrusted program itself [20].
The IRM approach is capable of enforcing a large class of powerful secu-
rity policies, including ones that that cannot be enforced without runtime
checks [12, 13]. But despite their power, the rewriters that automatically
generate IRM’s from untrusted programs are typically trusted components
of the system. Since rewriters tend to be large and complex when effi-
cient rewriting is required or complex security policies are to be enforced,
the rewriter becomes significant addition to the system’s trusted computing
base.
In comparison, type systems that employ static type-checkers are less
powerful in general, but the type-checkers tend to remain comparatively
simple and therefore more trustworthy.
In this paper, we present MOBILE, an extension to the .NET CIL that
makes it possible to automatically verify IRM’s using a static type-checker.
MOBILE (MOnitorable BIL with Effects) is an extension of BIL (Baby
Intermediate Language) [11], a substantial fragment of managed .NET CIL
that was used to develop generics for .NET [15]. MOBILE programs are
CIL programs with additional typing annotations that track an abstract
representation of program execution history. These typing annotations allow
a type-checker to verify statically that the runtime checks in-lined into the
untrusted program suffice to enforce a specified security policy. Once type-
checked, the typing annotations can be erased, and the IRM can be safely
executed as normal CIL code. This verification process allows a rewriter to
be removed from the trusted computing base and replaced with a (simpler)
type-checker. MOBILE thus leverages the power of IRM’s while using the
type-safety approach to keep the trusted computing base small.
Figure 1 summarizes a typical load path on a system that executes
IRM’s written in MOBILE. Untrusted, managed CIL code is first auto-
matically rewritten according to a security policy, yielding an IRM written
in MOBILE. The rewriting can be performed by either a code producer or
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Figure 1: A MOBILE load path
by a client machine receiving the untrusted code. Since the rewriter, and
therefore the IRM, remains untrusted, the IRM is then passed to a trusted
type-checker that cerifies the code with respect to the original security policy.
Code that satisfies the security policy will be approved by the type-checker,
and is therefore safe to execute; code that is not well-typed will be rejected
and would indicate a failure of the rewriter.
In this paper we focus on robust certification of MOBILE code; tech-
niques for efficient rewriting are left to future work. Our prototype imple-
mentation of MOBILE conists of a type-checker that verifies IRM’s that
model security policies using finite-state security automata. The implemen-
tation can verify both single-threaded and multi-threaded managed CIL
applications, and it supports language features beyond those modeled by
BIL, such as exceptions and finalizers.
2 Related Work
Type-systems λA [23] and λhist [21] enforce history-based security policies
over languages based on the λ-calculus. In both, program histories are
tracked at the type-level using effect types that represent an abstraction of
those global histories that might have been exhibited by the program prior
to control reaching any given program point.
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MOBILE differs from λA and λhist by tracking history on a per-object
basis. That is, both λA and λhist represent a program’s history as a finite or
infinite sequence of global program events, where the set of all possible global
program events is always finite. Policies that are only expressible using an
infinite set of global program events (e.g. events parameterized by object
instances) are therefore not enforceable by λA or λhist. For example, the
policy that every opened file must be closed by the time the program termi-
nates is not enforceable by either λA or λhist when the number of file objects
that could be allocated during the program’s execution is unbounded. In
object-oriented languages like the .NET CIL, policies concerning unbounded
collections of objects arise naturally, so it is not clear how λA or λhist can
be extended to such settings.
MOBILE, however, enforces policies that are universally quantified over
objects of any given class. For example, a MOBILE policy can dictate
that, for each file handle object the program allocates, an Open operation
must be performed on it before any Read operations can be performed on
it. MOBILE therefore allows objects to be treated as first-class in policy
specifications, whereas λA and λhist do not.
CQual [9] and Vault [4] are C-like languages that enforce history-based
properties of objects by employing a flow-sensitive, object-oriented type sys-
tem. Security-relevant objects in CQual or Vault programs have their base
types elaborated with type qualifiers, which track the security-relevant state
of the object. Control flow paths that include operations for changing the
security state of an object at runtime cause the type qualifier of that object
to change during type-checking. A type-checker can therefore determine if
any object might enter a state at runtime that violates the security policy.
Vault’s type system additionally includes variant types that allow a run-
time value to reflect an object’s current state. Untrusted programs can then
test such values before performing security-relevant operations on the ob-
jects they track. The Vault type-checker verifies that these runtime tests are
sufficient to guard against a security violation by refining an object’s type
qualifier along control flow paths that test such a runtime value.
Inspired by CQual and Vault, our work seeks to scale these ideas up to a
large existing programming language: the managed .NET CIL. In scaling up
to a larger-scale language, we adopt a somewhat different approach to track-
ing object security states at the type level. Both CQual and Vault assign
linear types to security-relevant objects (and, in the case of Vault, to run-
time state values), and use aliasing analyses to track changes to items with
linear types. However, it is not clear how such analyses can be extended to
support concurrency or to support an important technique commonly used
by IRM’s to track object security states, wherein security-relevant objects
are paired with runtime values that record their states, and then such pairs
are permitted to leak to the heap. Existing alias analyses cannot easily
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track items that are permitted to leak to the heap arbitrarily, or that can
be manipulated by multiple concurrent threads of execution.
We therefore take the approach of L3 [17], wherein linearly-typed items
are permitted to leak to the heap by packing them into shared data struc-
tures. These shared object-state pairs, called packages, can be aliased arbi-
trarily and are not tracked by the type system. MOBILE provides trusted
operations for packing and unpacking linear-typed items to and from shared
package objects. To perform any (security-relevant) operation that might
change a value with linear type, it must first be unpacked from any package
that contains it. As with ownership types [3, 2], packing and unpacking
operations are implemented as destructive reads, so that only one thread
can perform security-relevant operations on a given security-relevant object
at a time. By including appropriate pairing and unpairing operations in
the code, IRM’s can exploit the power of unrestricted aliasing, yet prove
through the type system that all security-relevant objects are still moni-
tored. MOBILE’s type system and the CLI permissions system are both
leveraged to ensure that invariants linking an object to an accurate runtime
representation of its state are not violated.
Although these two pairing and unpairing operations are fixed, the pre-
sentation of MOBILE in this paper does not fix any particular method of
representing object states at runtime or of dynamically testing those repre-
sentations. IRM’s can track object states using a variety of models including
DFA’s, LTL expressions, or even by recording an object’s complete history
at runtime. Thus, MOBILE constitutes a framework general enough to
implement many different in-lining strategies used by IRM’s.
3 Overview
A MOBILE security policy identifies a set of security-relevant object classes
and assigns a set of acceptable traces to each such class. A trace is a finite or
infinite sequence of security-relevant events—program operations that take
a security-relevant object as an argument. A MOBILE program satisfies
the security policy if (i) for every finite control flow path, the sequence
of security-relevant events performed on every object allocated along that
path is a member of the set of traces that the security policy has assigned to
that object’s class; and (ii) for every infinite control flow path, the sequence
of security-relevant operations performed on every security-relevant object
allocated along that path is a prefix of a member of the set of traces assigned
to that object’s class.
For example, a security policy that concerns files might identify the
System.IO.File class provided by the .NET Common Language Runtime
(CLR) as a security-relevant class, and might identify calls to the Open,
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Read, and Close methods of that class1 as security-relevant operations. A
security policy that requires programs to open files before reading them,
allows at most three reads per opened file, and requires programs to close
files before the program terminates, might assign (O (R ∪ R2 ∪ R3) C)ω as the
set of acceptable traces for class System.IO.File (where O, R, and C denote
Open, Read, and Close events, respectively, and ω denotes finite or infinite
repetition).
Although MOBILE security policies model events as operations per-
formed on objects, global events that do not concern any particular object
can be encoded as operations on a global object that is allocated at program
start and destroyed at program termination. Thus, MOBILE policies can
regard global events, per-object events, and combinations of the two.
For example, one might modify the example policy above by addition-
ally requiring that at most ten reads may occur during the lifetime of the
program. In that case, the global object would additionally be identified
as a security-relevant object, a Read method call performed on any File
object would be identified as a security-relevant event for the global ob-
ject, and the global object would be assigned the set of traces denoted by
 ∪ R ∪ R2 ∪ · · · ∪ R10.
We prove below that if a MOBILE program is well-typed with respect to
a given security policy, then the program satisfies the security policy. That
is, well-typed MOBILE programs are guaranteed, when executed, to exhibit
only those sequences of events that are permitted by the security policy. This
policy-adherence theorem comes in two parts. First, if a well-typed program
terminates normally, then the (finite) sequence of operations exhibited on
each object allocated during the program’s lifetime is a trace permitted by
the security policy for that object’s class. Second, regardless of whether a
well-typed program terminates normally, at every step in its execution, the
history of security-relevant operations performed on each object is a prefix
of a trace permitted by the security policy for that object’s class.
A rewriter that produces IRM’s from untrusted CIL code is expected
to produce well-typed MOBILE code, so that the policy-adherence theorem
can be used to guarantee that it is safe to execute. For this rewriting task
to be feasible, MOBILE’s type system must be flexible enough to permit
rewriters to insert runtime security checks—well-typed code that tracks the
state of security-relevant objects at runtime, testing aspects of the state
that cannot be verified statically. To that end, MOBILE supports a pack
operation that pairs a security-relevant object with a runtime value (e.g. an
integer) representing an abstraction of the object’s current state, and that
encapsulates them into a two-field package object. MOBILE’s unpack op-
1The .NET CLR’s File class does not actually have methods with these names, but
instead supports file I/O via other classes like the StreamReader class. We use more
typical names to clarify the example.
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eration can be used to unpack a package, yielding the original object that
was packed along with the runtime value that represents its state. MOBILE
programs can then test this runtime value to infer information about the
associated object’s state. Both pack and unpack are implemented as CIL
method calls to a small trusted library (about ten lines of C# code).
To keep type-checking tractable, MOBILE does not permit security-
relevant operations on objects that are packed. A package class’ two fields
are declared to be private so that, to access a security-relevant object
directly and perform operations on it, it must first be unpacked. While un-
packed, MOBILE allows only limited aliasing of security-relevant objects—
none of their aliases can escape to the heap. To enforce this restriction,
the unpack operation is implemented as a destructive read, preventing the
package from being unpacked again before it is re-packed. Packages, how-
ever, are permitted to escape to the heap and to undergo unlimited aliasing.
These restrictions allow the type-checker to statically track histories of un-
packed objects and to ensure that packed objects are always paired with a
value that accurately reflects their state. When an object is packed, it is
safe for the type-checker to forget whatever information might be statically
known about the object, keeping the type-checking algorithm tractable and
affording the rewriter a dynamic fallback mechanism when static analysis
cannot verify all security-relevant operations.
When pack and unpack are implemented as atomic operations,
MOBILE can also enforce security policies in concurrent settings. In
such a setting, MOBILE’s type system maintains the invariant that each
security-relevant object is either packed or held by at most one thread.
Packed objects are always policy-adherent, while unpacked objects are
tracked by the type system to ensure that they return to a policy-adherent
state before they are relinquished by the thread.
4 A Formal Analysis of MOBILE
4.1 The Abstract Machine
Figure 2 gives the instruction set of MOBILE. Like BIL, MOBILE’s syntax
is written in postfix notation. In addition to BIL instructions2, MOBILE
includes
• instruction evt, which performs a security-relevant operation on an
object,
2For simplicity, we omit BIL’s value classes and managed pointers from MOBILE, but
otherwise include all BIL types and instructions. Value classes and managed pointers
could be included without affecting any of the results in this paper.
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I ::= ldc.i4 n integer constant
I1 I2 I3 cond conditional
I1 I2 while while-loop
I1; I2 sequence
ldarg n method argument
I starg n store into arg
I1 . . . In newobj C(µ1, . . . , µn) make new obj
I0 I1 . . . In callvirt C::m.Sig method call
I ldfld µ C::f load from field
I1 I2 stfld µ C::f store into field
I evt e exhibit event
newpackage C make new package
I1 I2 I3 pack pack package
I unpack n unpack package
I1 I2 I3 condst C, k test state
I1 . . . In newhist C, k state constructor
v values*
I ret method return*
*Values and return instructions do not appear in MOBILE source code, but
are introduced by the small-step operational semantics as the program evalu-
ates.
Figure 2: The MOBILE instruction set
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Types τ ::= µ | C〈`〉
Untracked types µ ::= void | int32 | C〈?〉 | Rep
C
〈H〉
Class names C
Object identity variables `
History abstractions H ::=  | e |H1H2 |H1 ∪H2 |Hω |
θ |H1 ∩H2
History abstraction variables θ
Method signatures Sig ::= ∀Γin .((Ψin ,Fr in)(
∃Γout .(Ψout ,Frout , τ))
Typing contexts Γ ::= · | Γ, `:C | Γ, `:C〈?〉 | Γ, θ
Object history maps Ψ ::= 1 |Ψ ? (` 7→ H)
Local variable frames Fr ::= (τ0, . . . , τn)
Figure 3: The MOBILE type system
• instructions newpackage and newhist for creating packages and run-
time state values,
• instructions pack and unpack for packing/unpacking objects and run-
time state values to/from packages,
• instruction condst, which dynamically tests a runtime state value,
and
• the pseudo-instructions v and ret, which do not appear in source
code but are introduced in the intermediate stages of the small-step
semantics presented in §4.2.
Figure 3 provides MOBILE’s type system. MOBILE types consist of
void types, integers, classes, and history abstractions (the types of runtime
state values). The type of each unpacked, security-relevant object C〈`〉 is
parameterized by an object identity variable ` that uniquely identifies the
object. All aliases of the object have types with the same object iden-
tity variable, but other unpacked objects of the same class have types with
different object identity variables. The types C〈?〉 of packed classes and
security-irrelevant classes do not include object identity variables, and their
instances are therefore not distinguishable by the type system. We consider
MOBILE terms to be equivalent up to systematic alpha conversion of bound
variables.
The types Rep
C
〈H〉 of runtime state values are parameterized both by
the class type C of the object to which they refer and by a history abstraction
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τ  τ
H ⊆ H ′
Rep
C
〈H〉  Rep
C
〈H ′〉
τi  τ ′i ∀i ∈ 1..n
(τ0, . . . , τn)  (τ ′0, . . . , τ ′n)
Dom(Ψ) = Dom(Ψ′) Ψ(`) ⊆ Ψ′(`) ∀` ∈ Dom(Ψ)
Ψ  Ψ′
Figure 4: MOBILE subtyping
H—an ω-regular expression (plus variables and intersection) that denotes a
set of traces. In such an expression, ω denotes finite or infinite repetition.
Closed (i.e. variable-less) history abstractions conform to a subset re-
lation; we write H1 ⊆ H2 if the set of traces denoted by H1 is a subset
of the set of traces denoted by H2. This subset relation induces a natural
subtyping relation  given in Figure 4. Observe that the subtyping relation
in Figure 4 does not recognize class subtyping of security-relevant classes.
We leave support for subtyping of security-relevant classes to future work.
Type variables in MOBILE types are bound by typing contexts Γ, which
assign class or package types to object identity variables ` and delcare any
history abstraction variables θ. Object identity variables can additionally
appear in object history maps Ψ, which associate a history abstraction H
with each object identity variable that corresponds to an unpacked, security-
relevant object. Since object identity variables uniquely identify each object
instance, object history maps can be seen as a spatial conjunction (?) [19] of
assertions about the histories of the various unpacked objects in the heap.
A MOBILE method linearly transforms (() an object history map Ψin
describing the security states of any unpacked security-relevant objects on
the heap, and linearly transforms a frame describing any local variables on
the stack Fr in , to a new object history map Ψout , a new frame Frout , and
a return type τ . Any new typing variables introduced by the method are
bound in typing context Γout .
A complete MOBILE program consists of:
Class names C
Field types field : (C × f)→ µ
Class methods methodbody : (C::m.Sig)→ I
Class policies policy : C → H
We in addition use the notation fields(C) to refer to the number of fields in
class C.
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v ::= result
0 void
i4 integer
` heap pointer
rep
C
(H) runtime state value
o ::= heap elements
objC{fi = vi}
−→e object
pkg(`, rep
C
(H)) filled package
pkg(·) empty package
h ::= `i 7→ oi heap
a ::= (v0, . . . , vn) arguments
s ::= (a0, . . . , an) stack
ψ ::= (h, s) small-step store
Figure 5: The MOBILE memory model
4.2 Operational Semantics
Unlike [11], we provide a small-step operational semantics for MOBILE
rather than a large-step semantics, so as to apply the policy adherence the-
orems presented in §4.4 to programs that do not terminate or that enter a
bad state.
In MOBILE’s small-step memory model, presented in Figure 5, objects
consist not only of an assignment of values to fields but also a trace −→e that
records a history of the security-relevant operations performed on the object.
Although an object’s field assignments are stored in memory at runtime by
the virtual machine, object traces are not stored. We prove in §4.4 that
it is unnecessary for the virtual machine to track and store object traces,
because well-typed MOBILE code never exhibits a trace that violates the
security policy.
The small-step operational semantics of MOBILE, given in Figures 6
and 7, define how a given store ψ and instruction I steps to a new store ψ′
and instruction I ′, written ψ, I ψ′, I ′.
Rules 17 and 18 use notation not previously defined and therefore de-
serve special note. Runtime operations testC,k and hcC,k test runtime state
values and construct new runtime state values, respectively. Rather than
fixing these two operations, we allow MOBILE to be extended with un-
specified implementations of them. Different implementations of testC,k
and hcC,k can therefore be used to allow MOBILE to support different
collections of security policies. For example, a MOBILE system that sup-
ports security policies expressed as DFA’s might implement runtime state
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E ::=[ ] | E I2 I3 cond | E; I2 | E starg n |
v1 . . . vm E I1 . . . In newobj C(µ1, . . . , µm+n+1) |
v1 . . . vm E I1 . . . In callvirt C::m.Sig | E ret |
E ldfld µ C::f | E I2 stfld µ C::f | v1 E stfld µ C::f |
E evt e | E I2 I3 pack | v1 E I3 pack | v1 v2 E pack |
E unpack C, k | E I2 I3 condst C, k |
v1 . . . vm E I1 . . . In newhist C, k
Figure 6: MOBILE Evaluation Contexts
values as 32-bit integers and might support tests that compare runtime
state values to integer constants (to determine which state the DFA is
in). In that case, one could define for each k ∈ 0..232, hcC,k() = k and
testC,k(C,hv) = {1 if hv = k, else 0}. A more powerful (but more com-
putationally expensive) MOBILE system might implement runtime state
values as dynamic data structures that record an object’s entire trace and
might provide tests to examine such structures. In this paper, we assume
only that a finite or countably infinite collection of state value constructors
and tests exists and that this collection adheres to the typing constraints
19, 20, 21, and 22 presented in §4.3.
The operational semantics given in Figure 7 are for a single-threaded
virtual machine without support for finalizers. To model concurrency, one
could extend our stacks to consist of multiple threads, and add a small-
step rule that non-deterministically chooses which thread’s instruction to
execute next. Finalizers could be modeled by adding another small-step
rule that non-deterministically forks a finalizer thread whenever an object is
unreachable. Our implementation supports concurrency and finalizers, but
to simplify the presentation, we leave the analysis of these language features
to future work.
4.3 Type System
The operational semantics of MOBILE presented in §4.2 permit untyped
MOBILE programs to enter many bad terminal states. For example, an
untyped MOBILE program might attempt to load from a non-existent field
or attempt to unpack an empty package (in which case no small-step rule
can be applied, and and therefore no progress can be made). We consider a
terminal state to be “bad” if no progress can be made according to the small-
step rules given in Figure 7 but the MOBILE program has not been reduced
to a value. MOBILE’s type system seeks to prevent both policy violations
and bad terminal states, except that it does not seek to prevent unpack
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ψ, ldc.i4 i4  ψ, i4 (1)
ψ, I ψ′, I ′
ψ,E[I] ψ′, E[I ′]
(2)
if i4 = 0 then j = 3 else j = 2
ψ, i4 I2 I3 cond ψ, Ij
(3)
ψ, I1 I2 while ψ, I1 (I2; (I1 I2 while)) 0 cond (4)
ψ, v; I2 ψ, I2 (5)
0 ≤ j ≤ n
(h, s(v0, . . . , vn)), ldarg j (h, s(v0, . . . , vn)), vj
(6)
0 ≤ j ≤ n
(h, s(v0, . . . , vn)), v starg j 
(h, s(v0, . . . , vj−1, v, vj+1, . . . , vn)), 0
(7)
` 6∈ Dom(h) n = fields(C)
(h, s), v1 . . . vn newobj C(µ1, . . . , µn) 
(h[` 7→ objC{fi = vi|i ∈ 1..n}], s), `
(8)
methodbody(C::m.Sig) = I
(h, s), v0 . . . vn callvirt C::m.Sig (h, s(v0, . . . , vn)), I ret
(9)
(h, sa), v ret (h, s), v (10)
h(`) = objC{. . . , f = v, . . .}
−→e
(h, s), ` ldfld µ C::f (h, s), v
(11)
h(`) = objC{. . . , f = v, . . .}
−→e
(h, s), ` v′ stfld µ C::f (h[` 7→ objC [f 7→ v′]], s), 0
(12)
h(`) = objC{. . .}
−→e
(h, s), ` evt e1 (h[` 7→ objC{. . .}
−→e e1 ], s), 0
(13)
` 6∈ Dom(h)
(h, s),newpackage C (h[` 7→ pkg(·)], s), `
(14)
h(`) = pkg(. . .)
(h, s), ` `′ rep
C
(H) pack (h[` 7→ pkg(`′, rep
C
(H))], s), 0
(15)
h(`) = pkg(`′, rep
C
(H)) 0 ≤ j ≤ n
(h, s(v0, . . . , vn)), ` unpack j (
h[` 7→ pkg(·)], s(v0, . . . , vj−1, repC(H), vj+1, . . . , vn)
)
, `′
(16)
if testC,k(repC(H)) = 0 then j = 3 else j = 2
ψ, rep
C
(H) I2 I3 condst C, k ψ, Ij
(17)
arity(hcC,k) = n
ψ, v1 . . . vn newhist C, k ψ, hcC,k(v1, . . . , vn)
(18)
Figure 7: Small-step Operational Sematics for MOBILE
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1 (newobj C()) starg 1;
2 (ldarg 1) evt 9;
3 (ldarg 1) evt 8;
4 (newpackage C) stfld 2;
5 (ldarg 2) (ldarg 1) (newhist C, 0) pack;
6 (. . .) (ldarg 2) stfld . . . ;
7 ((ldarg 2) unpack 4) starg 3;
8 (ldarg 3) ((ldarg 4) evt 9) (. . .) condst C, 0
Figure 8: Sample MOBILE program
operations from being performed on empty packages. This reflects the reality
that in practical settings there will always be bad terminal states that are not
statically preventable. Instead, we prove in §4.4 that well-typed MOBILE
programs do not commit policy violations even if they enter a bad state,
such as by performing unpack on an empty package. Our implementation
responds unpack operations on empty packages by throwing an exception
that can be caught and handled by the caller. The type system prevents
such an exception from leading to a policy violation.
MOBILE’s type system considers a MOBILE term to be a linear operator
from a history map and frame list (describing the initial heap and stack,
respectively) to a new history map and frame list (describing the heap and
stack yielded by the operation) along with a return type. That is, we write
Γ ` I : (Ψ;−→Fr ) ( ∃Γ′.(Ψ′;−→Fr ′; τ ′) if term I, when evaluated in typing
context Γ, takes history map Ψ and frame list −→Fr (in which any typing
variables are bound in context Γ) to new history map Ψ′ and new frame
list −→Fr ′, and yields a value of type τ ′ (if it terminates). Any new typing
variables appearing in −→Fr ′ and τ ′ are bound in context Γ′.
Below, we provide an informal description of MOBILE’s typing rules by
walking the type-checking algorithm through the sample MOBILE program
given in Figure 8. A complete list of typing rules is stated formally in the
appendix.
Line 1 of the sample program creates a new object of class C and
stores it in local register 1. When a new security-relevant object is cre-
ated, MOBILE’s type system assigns it a fresh object identity variable `.
The return type of the the newly created object is thus C〈`〉 and the new
history map yielded by the operation satisfies Ψ′(`) = ; that is, new objects
are initially assigned the empty trace.
As security-relevant events are performed on the object (via evt instruc-
tions), the type system tracks these changes by statically updating its history
map to append these new events to the sequence it recorded in its history
map. So for example, after processing lines 2–3 of the sample program,
which perform events 9 and 8 on the object in local register 1, the type-
checker’s new history map would satisfy Ψ′(`) = 9 8. At each point that a
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security-relevant event is performed, the type system ensures that the new
trace satisfies the security policy. For example, when type-checking line 3,
the type-checker would verify that 9 8 ⊆ pre(policy(C)), where policy(C) de-
notes the set of acceptable traces assigned by the security policy to class C,
and pre(policy(C)) denotes the set of prefixes of members of set policy(C).
Security-relevant objects of type C〈`〉 are like typical objects except that
they are not permitted to escape to the heap. That is, they cannot be as-
signed to object fields. In order to leak a security-relevant object to the
heap, a MOBILE program must first store it in a package using a pack
instruction. This requires three steps: (1) A package must be created via a
newpackage instruction. (2) A runtime state value must be created that
accurately reflects the state of the object to be packed. This is accomplished
via the newhist instruction, which will be described in more detail below.
(3) Finally, the pack operation is used to store the object and the runtime
state value into the package. Lines 4 and 5 of the sample program illustrate
these three steps. Line 4 creates a new package and stores it in local regis-
ter 2. Line 5 then fills the package using the object in local register 1 along
with a newly created runtime state value.
In order for MOBILE’s type system to accept a pack operation, it must
be able to statically verify that the runtime state value is an accurate ab-
straction of the object being packed. That is, if the runtime state value
has type Rep
C
〈H〉, then the type system requires that Ψ(`) ⊆ H where ` is
the object identity variable of the object being packed. Additionally, since
packed objects are untracked and therefore might continue to exist until the
program terminates, packed objects must satisfy the security policy. That
is, we require that Ψ(`) ⊆ policy(C).
Packages that contain security-relevant objects can leak to the heap, as
illustrated by line 6 of the sample program, which stores the package to a
field of some other object.
After a pack operation, the type system removes object identity variable
` from the history map. Hence, after line 5 of the sample program, Ψ′(`)
is undefined and the object that was packed becomes inaccessible. If the
program were to subsequently attempt to load from local register 1 (before
replacing its contents with something else), the type-checker would reject
because that register now contains a value with an invalid type. Object
identity variable ` can therefore be thought of as a capability that has been
revoked from the local scope and given to the package.
In order to perform more security-relevant events on an object, a
MOBILE program must first reacquire a capability for the object by
unpacking the object from its package via an unpack instruction. Line 7
of the sample program unpacks the package in local register 2, storing the
extracted object in local register 3 and storing the runtime state value that
was packaged with it in local register 4. Since packages and the objects
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they contain are not tracked by the type system, the type system cannot
statically determine the history of a freshly unpacked object. All that is
statically known is that the runtime state value that will be yielded at
runtime by the unpack instruction will be an accurate representation of the
unpacked object’s history. To reflect this information statically, the type
system assigns a fresh object identity variable `′ to the unpacked object
and a fresh history variable θ to the unknown history. The unpacked object
and runtime state value then have types C〈`′〉 and Rep
C
〈θ〉, respectively,
and the new history map satisfies Ψ′(`′) = θ.
If the sample program were at this point to perform security-relevant
event k on the newly unpacked object, MOBILE’s type system would re-
ject because it would be unable to statically verify that θ k ⊆ policy(C)
(since nothing is statically known about history θ). However, a MOBILE
program can perform additional evt operations on the object by first dynam-
ically testing the runtime state value yielded by the unpack operation. If a
MOBILE program dynamically tests a value of type Rep
C
〈θ〉, MOBILE’s
type system can statically infer information about history θ within the
branches of the conditional. For example, if a condst instruction is used to
test a value with type Rep
C
〈θ〉 for equality with a value of type Rep
C
〈9 8〉,
then in the positive branch of the conditional, the type system can statically
infer that θ = 98. If policy(C) = (9 8)ω, then a MOBILE program could
execute I evt 9 within the positive branch of such a conditional (where I
is the object that was unpacked), because 9 8 9 ⊆ pre((9 8)ω); but the type-
checker would reject a program that executed I evt 8 in the positive branch,
since 9 8 8 6⊆ pre((9 8)ω).
MOBILE supports many possible schemes for representing histories at
runtime and for testing them, so rather than fixing particular operations
for constructing runtime state values and particular operations for testing
them, we instead assume only that there exists a countable collection of
constructors newhist C, k and conditionals condst C, k for all integers k,
that construct runtime state values and test runtime state values (respec-
tively) for objects of class C. We then abstractly define HCC,k(. . .) to be
the type Rep
C
〈H〉 of a history value constructed using constructor k for
security-relevant class C, and we define ctx+C,k(H,Ψ) and ctx
−
C,k(H,Ψ) to be
the object history maps that refine Ψ in the positive and negative branches
(respectively) of a conditional that performs test k on a history value of type
Rep
C
〈H〉. MOBILE supports any such refinement that is sound in the sense
that
testC,k(H) = 0 =⇒ Ψ  ctx−C,k(H,Ψ)(`) (19)
and
testC,k(H) 6= 0 =⇒ Ψ  ctx+C,k(H,Ψ)(`) (20)
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We further assume that each history type constructor HCC,k(. . .) accurately
reflects its runtime implementation, in the sense that for all history value
types Rep
C1
〈H1〉, . . . ,RepCn〈Hn〉 such that n = arity(HCC,k), there exists
some H such that
HCC,k(RepC1〈H1〉, . . . ,RepCn〈Hn〉) = RepC〈H〉 (21)
and
hcC,k(repC1(H1), . . . , repCn(Hn)) = repC(H) (22)
In the sample program, suppose that history value constructor
newhist C, 0 takes no arguments and yields a runtime value that rep-
resents history 9 8; and suppose that conditional test condst C, 0 compares
a runtime state value to the value that represents history 9 8. Formally,
suppose that HCC,0() = RepC〈9 8〉 and ctx+C,0(θ,Ψ) = Ψ[θ 7→ 9 8]. Thus, in
the positive branch of such a test, the type-checker’s object history map
can be refined by substituting 9 8 for any instances of the history variable
being tested. Then if policy(C) = (9 8)ω, a MOBILE type-checker would
accept the sample program. In the positive branch of the conditional in
line 8, the type-checker would infer that the object in local register 4 has
history 9 8, and therefore it is safe to perform event 9 on it. However, if
policy(C) = 9 8 8, then the type-checker would reject, because 9 8 9 is not a
prefix of 9 8 8.
Our implementation of MOBILE implements history abstraction values
as integers. Thus, it provides 232 newhist operations for each security-
relevant class C, defining hcC,k() = k for all k ∈ 0..232 − 1. Tests condst of
runtime state values are implemented as equality comparisons between the
integer runtime state value to be tested and an integer constant. Thus, we
define
testC,k(repC(θ)) =
{
1 if rep
C
(θ) = k
0 otherwise
ctx+C,k(θ,Ψ) = Ψ[θ 7→ θ ∩Hk]
ctx−C,k(θ,Ψ) = Ψ[θ 7→ θ ∩ (∪i6=kHi)]
for each integer k ∈ 0..232 − 1, where Hk is a closed history abstraction
statically assigned to integer constant k. The assignments of closed history
abstractions Hk to integers k are not trusted, so this mapping can be defined
by the MOBILE program itself (e.g., in settings where IRM’s are produced
by a common rewriter or where separately produced IRM’s do not exchange
objects) or by the policy-writer (in settings where the mapping must be
defined at a system global level for consistency).
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The above scheme allows a MOBILE program to represent object secu-
rity states at runtime with a security automaton of 232 states or less. Each
state of the automaton is assigned an integer constant k, and history ab-
straction Hk would denote the set of traces that cause the automaton to
arrive in state k.
Many other extensions to MOBILE are also possible. For example,
rather than implementing runtime state values as simple integers, they could
be implemented as data structures that store LTL expressions or complete
trace histories. Tests of these data structures could be implemented as calls
to methods in a trusted library.
4.4 Policy Adherence of MOBILE Programs
We now prove that MOBILE programs well-typed with respect to a security
policy will not violate the security policy when executed. Formally, we define
well-typed by
Definition 1. A method C::m.Sig with Sig = ∀Γin .(Ψin ,Fr in) (
∃Γout .(Ψout ,Frout , τ) is well-typed if and only if there exists a deriva-
tion for the typing judgment Γin ` I : (Ψin ,Fr in) ( ∃Γout .(Ψout ,Frout , τ)
where I = methodbody(C::m.Sig).
Definition 2. A MOBILE program is well-typed if and only if (1) for all
C::m.Sig ∈ Dom(methodbody), method C::m.Sig is well-typed, and (2) there
exists a method Cmain ::main.Sigmain ∈ Dom(methodbody) with Sigmain =
∀Γin .(Ψin , (τ1, . . . , τn)) ( ∃Γout .(Ψout ,Frout , τout) such that for all substi-
tutions σ : θ → −→e and all object identity variables `:C ∈ (Γin ,Γout), if
Ψout(`) = H then σ(H) ⊆ policy(C).
Part 2 of definition 2 captures the requirement that a MOBILE program’s
entry method must have a signature that complies with the security policy
on exit.
Policy violations are defined differently depending on whether the pro-
gram terminates normally. If the program terminates, MOBILE’s type sys-
tem guarantees that the resulting heap will be policy-adherent; whereas if
the program does not terminate or enters a bad state, MOBILE guarantees
only that the heap at each evaluation step will be prefix-adherent, where
policy- and prefix-adherence are defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Policy Adherent). A heap h is policy-adherent if, for all class
objects objC{. . .}
−→e ∈ Rng(h), −→e ⊆ policy(C).
Definition 4 (Prefix Adherent). A heap h is prefix-adherent if, for all class
objects objC{. . .}
−→e ∈ Rng(h), −→e ⊆ pre(policy(C)).
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Γ `heap h : Γ `hist h : (Γ;Ψ) Γ `stack s : −→Fr
Γ ` (h, s) : (Ψ;−→Fr )
(23)
Γ0 `heap h : Γ
Γ0 ` vi : (Ψ;−→Fr )( (Ψ;−→Fr ;field(C, fi)) ∀i ∈ 1..fields(C)
Γ0 `heap h, (` 7→ objC{fi = vi|i ∈ 1..fields(C)}
−→e ) : Γ, `:C
(24)
Γ0 `heap h : Γ
Γ0 `heap h, (` 7→ pkg(. . .)) : Γ, `:C〈?〉
(25)
Γ0 `heap h : Γ
Γ0 `heap h : Γ, θ
(26)
Γ0 `heap · : ·
(27)
`hist h : (Γ;Ψ) −→e ⊆ H
`hist h, (` 7→ objC{. . .}
−→e ) : (Γ, `:C; Ψ ? (` 7→ H))
(28)
`hist h : (Γ;Ψ) −→e ⊆ H ⊆ policy(C)
`hist h, (` 7→ pkg(`′, repC(H))), (`′ 7→ objC{. . .}
−→e ) :
(Γ, `:C〈?〉, `′:C; Ψ)
(29)
`hist h : (Γ;Ψ) −→e ⊆ policy(C)
`hist h, (` 7→ objC{. . .}
−→e ) : (Γ, `:C; Ψ)
(30)
`hist h : (Γ;Ψ)
`hist h, (` 7→ pkg(·)) : (Γ, `:C〈?〉; Ψ)
(31)
`hist h : (Γ;Ψ)
`hist h : (Γ, θ; Ψ)
(32)
`hist · : (·; 1)
(33)
Γ `stack s : −→Fr Γ ` vi : (Ψ;−→Fr 0)( (Ψ;−→Fr 0; τi) ∀i ∈ 0..n
Γ `stack s(v0, . . . , vn) : −→Fr (τ0, . . . , τn)
(34)
Γ `stack · : ·
(35)
Figure 9: Consistency of MOBILE Statics and Dynamics
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To formalize the theorem, we first define a notion of consistency between
a static typing context and a runtime memory state. We say that a memory
store ψ respects an object identity context Ψ and a list of frames −→Fr , written
Γ ` ψ : (Ψ;−→Fr ) if there exists a derivation using the the inference rules given
in Figure 9. The following two theorems then establish that well-typed
MOBILE programs do not violate the security policy.
Theorem 1 (Terminating Policy Adherence). Assume that a MOBILE
program is well-typed, and that, as per Definition 2, its main method has
signature Sigmain = ∀Γin .(Ψin , (τ1, . . . , τn))( ∃Γout .(Ψout ,Frout , τout). If
Γin ` ψ : (Ψin ;Fr) holds and if ψ,methodbody(Cmain ::main.Sig) ∗(h′, s′), v
holds, then h′ is policy-adherent.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Theorem 2 (Non-terminating Prefix Adherence). Assume that a
MOBILE program is well-typed, and assume that Γ ` I : (Ψ;−→Fr ) (
∃Γ′.(Ψ′;−→Fr ′; τ) and Γ ` (h; s) : (Ψ;−→Fr ) hold. If h is prefix-adherent and
(h, s), I n(h′, s′), I ′ holds, then h′ is prefix-adherent.
Proof. See Appendix B.
An important consequence of both of the above theorems is that
MOBILE can be implemented on existing .NET systems without modify-
ing the memory model to store object traces at runtime. Since a static
type-checker can verify that MOBILE code is well-typed, and since the
theorems prove that well-typed code never exhibits a trace that violates the
security policy, the runtime system need not store or monitor object traces
to prevent security violations.
5 Implementation
Our prototype implementation of MOBILE consists of a type-checker for
MOBILE’s type system extended to the full managed subset of Microsoft’s
.NET CIL. The type-checker was written in Ocaml (about one thousand lines
of code) and uses Microsoft’s .NET ILX SDK [22] to read and manipulate
.NET bytecode binaries. MOBILE programs are .NET CIL programs with
typing annotations encoded as .NET method attributes. The MOBILE type-
checker reads these (untrusted) annotations and verifies them in the course
of type-checking. The type-checking algorithm is linear in the size of the
program.
Our implementation allows security policies to identify method calls as
security-relevant events. Thus, security policies can constrain the usage of
resources provided by the CLR by monitoring CLR method calls and the
objects they return. Our type-checker can, in principle, regard any CIL
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struct Package {
private object obj;
private int state;
public void Pack(object o, int s) {
lock (o) { obj=o; state=s; }
}
public object Unpack(ref int s) {
lock (obj) {
object o=obj;
if (o==null) throw new EmptyPackage();
obj=null; s=state;
return o;
}
}
}
Figure 10: Implementation of pack and unpack
instruction as a security-relevant event, but we leave practical investigation
of this feature to future work.
Operations pack and unpack are implemented as method calls to the
(very small) trusted C# library given in Figure 10. History abstraction
values are implemented as integers. Thus, our newhist operation is sim-
ply a ldc.i4 instruction that loads an integer constant onto the evaluation
stack. Policies can statically declare for each integer constant a closed his-
tory abstraction that integer represents when used as a runtime state value
at runtime. Tests of runtime state values consist of equality comparisons
with integer constants in the manner described in §4.3.
With this simple support for history abstractions and tests, our type-
checker can support IRM’s that enforce security policies by expressing each
object’s state with a security automaton. Such an IRM can assign an in-
teger constant to each state of the automaton, and can associate with each
such constant a history abstraction that denotes the set of traces causing
the automaton to enter the given state. The integer equality tests then al-
low the IRM to test whether any object’s automaton is in any particular
state. The type-checker must verify subset relations over the regular ex-
pressions3defined by these automata, which means that our type-checking
3Although the language of history abstractions given in Figure 3 includes infinite rep-
etition (ω), variables (θ), and intersection (∩), in practice a regular expression subset
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algorithm is cubic in the size of the security policy as expressed as a security
automaton.
Our type-checker also recognizes method annotations attached to final-
izers of security-relevant classes. This allows security policies to be divided
into two levels of enforcement: one to be enforced prior to garbage-collection
and one to be enforced at garbage-collection. The part of a security pol-
icy expressed in the finalizer’s precondition must be satisfied whenever the
object escapes to the heap (i.e. when it is packed), since at any point after
that, its package object could become orphaned and then garbage-collected.
When garbage-collection occurs, the object must satisfy the secondary re-
quirement imposed by the finalizer’s postcondition. This allows an IRM to
use finalizer code to enforce the security policy.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
MOBILE’s type system and the theorems presented in §4.4 show that a
common style of IRM, in which extra state variables and guards that model
a security automaton have been in-lined into the untrusted code, can be
independently verified by a type-checker, eliminating the need to trust the
rewriter that produced the IRM.We verify policies that are universally quan-
tified over unbounded collections of objects—that is, policies that require
each object to exhibit a history of security-relevant events that conforms to
some stated property. Properties can be expressed as DFA’s, LTL expres-
sions, or any computable language of finite and infinite event sequences.
Our implementation of MOBILE for managed Microsoft .NET CIL
demonstrates that this verification procedure can be scaled to real type-
safe, low-level languages. Policies can be verified in the presence of
exceptions, concurrency, finalizers, and non-termination.
Our presentation of MOBILE has not addressed issues of object inheri-
tance of security-relevant classes. Future work should examine how to safely
express and implement policies that require objects related by inheritance
to conform to different properties. A type-checker for such a system would
need to identify when a typecast at runtime could potentially lead to a vi-
olation of the policy and provide a means for policy-adherent programs to
perform necessary typecasts.
Another open problem is how to support a wider range of IRM imple-
mentations. MOBILE supports only a specific (but typical) treatment of
runtime state, wherein each security-relevant object is paired with a dy-
algorithm suffices to decide subset for any history abstractions that appear in practice.
This is because variables only ever appear at the beginnings of history abstractions, in-
tersection only occurs between a variable and a closed history abstraction, and subset
can be decided for ω-regular expressions lacking Kleene-stars by replacing the ω’s with
Kleene-stars.
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namic representation of its state every time it is leaked to the heap. In some
settings, it may be desirable to implement IRM’s that store an object’s dy-
namic state differently, such as in a separate array rather than packaged
together with the object it models. A type system that supports these de-
coupled objects and states would somehow need to maintain the invariant
that security-relevant objects and the runtime state values that monitor
them remain consistent with one another.
We chose a type system for MOBILE that statically tracks control flow in
a data-insensitive manner, with ω-regular expressions denoting sets of event
sequences. This approach is appealing in that there is a natural rewriting
strategy whereby well-typed MOBILE code can be automatically generated
from untrusted CIL code. That is, one could replace all security-relevant
objects with packages that contain those objects, and surround any security-
relevant events with an unpack, a suitable state test, and a re-pack. However,
a more powerful type system could employ a richer language like Hoare
Logic [14] to track data-sensitive control flow. This could be potentially
advantageous in that it might allow clever rewriters to eliminate some of
these dynamic operations by statically proving to the type-checker that they
are unnecessary. Future work should investigate rewriting strategies that
could make such an approach worthwhile, and consider how to implement a
type-checker that combines data-sensitive control flow analysis, spatial logic,
and object-oriented languages.
Finally, not every enforceable security policy can be couched as a com-
putable property that is universally quantified over object instances. For
example, one potentially useful policy is one that requires that for every
file object opened for writing, there exists an encryptor object to which its
output stream has been linked. Such a policy is not supported by MOBILE
because it regards both universal and existentially quantified properties that
relate multiple object instances. Future work should consider how to im-
plement IRM’s that enforce such policies, and how these implementations
could be type-checked so as to statically verify that the IRM satisfies the
security policy.
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A Typing Rules
The following is a formal statement of MOBILE’s typing rules.
Γ ` ldc.i4 n : (Ψ;−→Fr )( (Ψ;−→Fr ; int32) (36)
Γ ` I1 : (Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ1.(Ψ1;−→Fr 1; int32)
Γ,Γ1 ` Ii : (Ψ1;−→Fr 1)( ∃Γ′.(Ψ′;−→Fr ′; τ) ∀i ∈ {2, 3}
Γ ` I1 I2 I3 cond : (Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ1,Γ′.(Ψ′;−→Fr ′; τ)
(37)
Γ,Γ′ ` I1 I2 0 cond : (Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ′.(Ψ;−→Fr ;void)
Γ,Γ′ ` I1 I2 while : (Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ′.(Ψ;−→Fr ;void)
(38)
Γ ` I1 : (Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ1.(Ψ1;−→Fr 1;void)
Γ,Γ1 ` I2 : (Ψ1;−→Fr 1)( ∃Γ2.(Ψ′;−→Fr ′; τ)
Γ ` I1; I2 : (Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ1,Γ2.(Ψ′;−→Fr ′; τ)
(39)
` ∈ Dom(Ψ′) field(C, f) = µ
Γ ` I : (Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ′.(Ψ′;−→Fr ′;C〈`〉)
Γ ` I ldfld µ C::f : (Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ′.(Ψ′;−→Fr ′;µ)
(40)
Γ ` I1 : (Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ1.(Ψ1;−→Fr 1;C〈`〉)
Γ,Γ1 ` I2 : (Ψ1;−→Fr 1)( ∃Γ2.(Ψ′;−→Fr ′;µ)
` ∈ Dom(Ψ′)
field(C, f) = µ
Γ ` I1 I2 stfld µ C::f : (Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ1,Γ2.(Ψ′;−→Fr ′;void)
(41)
0 ≤ j ≤ n
Γ ` ldarg j : (Ψ;−→Fr (τ0, . . . , τn))( (Ψ;−→Fr (τ0, . . . , τn); τj)
(42)
Γ ` I : (Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ′.(Ψ′;−→Fr ′(τ0, . . . , τn); τ) 0 ≤ j ≤ n
Γ ` I starg j : (Ψ;−→Fr )(
∃Γ′.(Ψ′;−→Fr ′(τ0, . . . , τj−1, τ, τj+1, . . . , τn);void)
(43)
Γ,Γ1, . . . ,Γi−1 ` Ii : (Ψi−1;−→Fr i−1)(
∃Γi.(Ψi;−→Fr i;µi) ∀i ∈ 1..n
n = fields(C) ` 6∈ Dom(Γ,Γ1, . . . ,Γn)  ∈ pre(policy(C))
Γ ` I1 . . . In newobj C(µ1, . . . , µn) :
(Ψ0;
−→Fr 0)( ∃Γ1, . . . ,Γn, `:C.(Ψn ? (` 7→ );−→Fr n;C〈`〉)
(44)
Γ0, . . . ,Γj ` Ij : (Ψj ,−→Fr j)( ∃Γj+1.(Ψj+1,−→Fr j+1, τj) ∀j ∈ 0..n
τ0 = C〈`〉 ` ∈ Dom(Ψn+1) C::m.Sig ∈ Dom(methodbody)
Γ0, . . . ,Γn ` Sig <: (Ψin , (τ0, . . . , τn))( ∃Γout .(Ψout ,Frout , τ)
Ψn+1 = Ψunused ?Ψin
Γ0 ` I0 . . . In callvirt C::m.Sig :
(Ψ0,
−→Fr 0)( ∃Γ1, . . . ,Γn+1,Γout .(Ψunused ?Ψout ,−→Fr n+1, τ)
(45)
He ⊆ pre(policy(C))
Γ ` I : (Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ′.(Ψ′ ? (` 7→ H);−→Fr ′;C〈`〉)
Γ ` I evt e : (Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ′.(Ψ′ ? (` 7→ He);−→Fr ′;void)
(46)
` 6∈ Dom(Γ)
Γ ` newpackage C : (Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃`:C〈?〉.(Ψ;−→Fr ;C〈?〉)
(47)
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H ⊆ H ′ ⊆ policy(C)
Γ ` I1 : (Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ1.(Ψ1;−→Fr 1;C〈?〉)
Γ,Γ1 ` I2 : (Ψ1;−→Fr 1)( ∃Γ2.(Ψ2;−→Fr 2;C〈`〉)
Γ,Γ1,Γ2 ` I3 : (Ψ2;−→Fr 2)( ∃Γ3.(Ψ′ ? (` 7→ H);−→Fr ′;RepC〈H ′〉)
Γ ` I1 I2 I3 pack : (Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ1,Γ2,Γ3.(Ψ′;−→Fr ′;void)
(48)
` 6∈ Dom(Ψ′) θ 6∈ Dom(Γ)
Γ ` I : (Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ′.(Ψ′;−→Fr ′(τ0, . . . , τn);C〈?〉)
Γ ` I unpack j : (Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ′, `:C, θ.
(Ψ′, ` 7→ θ;−→Fr ′(τ0, . . . , τj−1,RepC〈θ〉, τj+1, . . . , τn);C〈`〉)
(49)
Γ ` I1 : (Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ1.(Ψ1;−→Fr 1;RepC〈H〉)
Γ,Γ1 ` I2 : (ctx+C,k(H,Ψ1);−→Fr 1)( ∃Γ′.(Ψ′;−→Fr
′
; τ)
Γ,Γ1 ` I3 : (ctx−C,k(H,Ψ1);−→Fr 1)( ∃Γ′.(Ψ′;−→Fr
′
; τ)
Γ ` I1 I2 I3 condst k : (Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ1,Γ′.(Ψ′;−→Fr ′; τ)
(50)
Γ ` Ii : (Ψi−1;−→Fr i−1)( ∃Γi.(Ψi;−→Fr i;RepCi〈Hi〉) ∀i ∈ 1..n
Γ ` I1 . . . In newhist C, k : (Ψ0;−→Fr 0)( ∃Γ1, . . . ,Γn.
(Ψn;
−→Fr n;HCC,k(RepC1〈H1〉, . . . ,RepCn〈Hn〉))
(51)
Γ1,Γ′ ` I : (Ψ1;−→Fr 1)( ∃Γ2.(Ψ2;−→Fr 2; τ)
Ψ′1  Ψ1 −→Fr
′
1  −→Fr 1 Ψ2  Ψ′2 −→Fr 2  −→Fr
′
2 τ  τ ′
Γ1,Γ′ ` I : (Ψ′1;−→Fr
′
1)( ∃Γ2,Γ′.(Ψ′2;−→Fr
′
2; τ
′)
(52)
Γ ` 0 : (Ψ;−→Fr )( (Ψ;−→Fr ;void)
(53)
Γ ` i4 : (Ψ;−→Fr )( (Ψ;−→Fr ; int32)
(54)
Ψ = Ψ′ ? (` 7→ H)
Γ, `:C ` ` : (Ψ;−→Fr )( (Ψ;−→Fr ;C〈`〉)
(55)
Γ, `:C〈?〉 ` ` : (Ψ;−→Fr )( (Ψ;−→Fr ;C〈?〉)
(56)
Γ ` rep
C
(H) : (Ψ;−→Fr )( (Ψ;−→Fr ;Rep
C
〈H〉)
(57)
Γ ` I : (Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ′.(Ψ′;−→Fr ′Fr0; τ)
Γ ` I ret : (Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ′.(Ψ′;−→Fr ′; τ)
(58)
The judgment Γ ` Sig1 <: Sig2 in rule 45 asserts that Sig1 alpha-
varies to Sig2. That is, there exists a substitution σ : ` → ` such that
σ(Sig1) = Sig2 and any free variables in Sig2 are drawn from Γ. This
captures the requirement that call sites must satisfy the callee’s precondition
and can assume the callee’s postcondition.
B Proofs
The proofs of Terminating Policy Adherence (Theorem 1) and of Non-
terminating Prefix Adherence (Theorem 2) are arrived at in three steps.
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First, in §B.2 we prove subject reduction for the type system. That is, we
prove that taking a step according to the operational semantics provided in
Figure 7 preserves the type of a MOBILE term as defined in Appendix A.
Second, in §B.3 we prove that well-typed MOBILE terms can take a step as
long as they have not been reduced to a value or have not entered a “bad”
state, such as by performing an unpack operation on an empty package.
Third, these two results are leveraged in §B.4 to prove Terminating Policy
Adherence and Non-terminating Prefix Adherence theorems. That is, we
show that well-typed MOBILE programs that terminate normally will sat-
isfy the security policy, and that well-typed MOBILE programs that do not
terminate or that enter a “bad” state will satisfy a prefix of the security
policy.
B.1 Canonical Derivations
In the proofs that follow, it will be useful to appeal to the following “ob-
vious” facts about the derivation system given in Figure 9. (Proofs of the
facts below can be obtained by trivial inductions over the derivations of the
various relevant judgments.)
Fact 1. If Γ′ `heap h : Γ holds then the following three statements are
equivalent:
(i) Γ = Γ0, `:C
(ii) h = h0, (` 7→ objC{fi = vi|i ∈ 1..fields(C)}
−→e )
(iii) There exists a derivation of Γ `heap h : Γ that ends in
Γ′ `heap h0 : Γ0
Γ′ ` vi : (Ψ;−→Fr )( (Ψ;−→Fr ;field(C, fi)) ∀i ∈ 1..fields(C)(24)
Γ′ `heap h : Γ
and the following three statements are equivalent:
(i) Γ = Γ0, `:C〈?〉
(ii) h = h0, (` 7→ pkg(. . .))
(iii) There exists a derivation of Γ `heap h : Γ that ends in
Γ′ `heap h0 : Γ0 (25)
Γ′ `heap h : Γ
Fact 2. If `hist h : (Γ;Ψ) holds then the following three statements are
equivalent:
(i) Γ = Γ0, `′:C
(ii) h = h0, (`′ 7→ objC{. . .}
−→e )
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(iii) There exists a derivation of `hist h : (Γ;Ψ) that ends in one of
`hist h0 : (Γ0; Ψ0) −→e ⊆ H (28)`hist h : (Γ;Ψ)
,
`hist h1 : (Γ1; Ψ) −→e ⊆ H ⊆ policy(C)(29)`hist h : (Γ;Ψ)
, or
`hist h0 : (Γ0; Ψ) −→e ⊆ policy(C)(30)`hist h : (Γ;Ψ)
where Ψ = Ψ0 ? (`′ 7→ H), Γ1 = Γ0, `:C〈?〉, and h1 = h0, (` 7→
pkg(`′, rep
C
(H)));
and the following three statements are equivalent:
(i) Γ = Γ0, `:C〈?〉
(ii) h = h0, (` 7→ pkg(. . .))
(iii) There exists a derivation of `hist h : (Γ;Ψ) that ends in one of
`hist h1 : (Γ1; Ψ) −→e ⊆ H ⊆ policy(C)(29)`hist h : (Γ;Ψ)
or
`hist h0 : (Γ0; Ψ)(31)`hist h : (Γ;Ψ)
where Γ1 = Γ0, `:C〈?〉 and h1 = h0, (` 7→ pkg(`′, repC(H))).
Fact 3. The following judgments can be weakened in the following ways:
1. If Γ0 `heap h : Γ holds then Γ0,Γ′ `heap h : Γ also holds.
2. If Γ0 `stack s : −→Fr holds then Γ0,Γ′ `stack s : −→Fr also holds.
3. If Γ0 ` I : (Ψ;−→Fr ) ( ∃Γ′′.(Ψ′′;−→Fr ′′; τ) holds then Γ0,Γ′ ` I :
(Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ′′.(Ψ′′;−→Fr ′′; τ) also holds.
Facts 1 and 2 state that when Γ′ `heap h : Γ holds or `hist h : (Γ;Ψ)
holds, then Γ and h match element for element, and there is a way to
reorganize the derivation of either judgment to bring the rule that refers to
any particular element to the bottom of the derivation tree. That is, the
rule applications in either derivation can be reordered arbitrarily. Fact 3
states that judgment Γ0 `heap h : Γ, judgment Γ0 `stack s : −→Fr , and judgment
Γ0 ` I : (Ψ;−→Fr ) ( ∃Γ′′.(Ψ′′;−→Fr ′′; τ) can be weakened by adding more
elements to Γ0.
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B.2 Subject Reduction
Lemma 1 (Context Widening). If Γ ` I : (Ψ;Fr)( ∃Γ′.(Ψ′;Fr ′; τ) holds
and I contains no ret instructions, then Γ ` I : (Ψextra ? Ψ;−→Fr Fr) (
∃Γ′.(Ψextra ?Ψ′;−→Fr Fr ′; τ) holds.
Proof. Observe that all typing rules except the typing rule for ret (58) are
parameterized by an arbitrary frame list prefix that remains unchanged by
an application of the rule. Since I has no ret instructions, this suffices to
prove that Γ ` I : (Ψ;−→Fr Fr)( ∃Γ′.(Ψ′;−→Fr Fr ′; τ) holds.
It remains to show that Ψ ` I : (Ψextra ?Ψ;Fr)( ∃Γ′.(Ψextra ?Ψ′;Fr ′; τ)
holds. Let D be the derivation of Γ ` I : (Ψ;Fr)( ∃Γ′.(Ψ′;Fr ′; τ). Proof
is by induction on the structure of D.
Case 1: D ends in rule 36, 42, 47, 53, 54, 55, 56, or 57. In these cases,
Ψ′ = Ψ. The lemma follows immediately by instantiating Ψ with
Ψextra ?Ψ in each typing rule.
Case 2: D ends in rule 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 46, 48, 49, 50, or 51.
The lemma follows by inductive hypothesis, by instantiating each an-
tecedent of the form Γ0 ` I0 : (Ψ0;Fr0) ( ∃Γ′0.(Ψ′0;Fr ′0; τ0) with
Γ0 ` I0 : (Ψextra ?Ψ0;Fr0)( ∃Γ′0.(Ψextra ?Ψ′0;Fr ′0; τ0).
Case 3: D ends in rule 45. In addition to instantiating into each antecedent
as in the previous case, instantiate Ψunused with Ψextra ?Ψunused . The
lemma then holds by inductive hypothesis.
Case 4: D ends in rule 52. Observe from the subtyping rules that if Ψ1 
Ψ′1 then Ψextra ? Ψ1  Ψextra ? Ψ′1. We can therefore instantiate the
rule’s antecedents as in the previous two cases to prove the lemma by
inductive hypothesis.
Lemma 2 (Context Subtyping). If `hist h : (Γ;Ψ) and Ψ  Ψ′ hold then
`hist h : (Γ;Ψ′) holds.
Proof. Let D be a derivation of `hist h : (Γ;Ψ). Proof is by induction over
the structure of D.
Base Case: If D ends with rule 33, then Ψ = Ψ′ = · and the lemma holds
immediately.
Inductive Case: If D ends in any remaining rule other than rule 28, then
the lemma follows immediately from the inductive hypothesis. Assume
D ends in rule 28 and therefore has the form
`hist h0 : (Γ0; Ψ0) −→e ⊆ H (28)`hist h : (Γ;Ψ)
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where Γ = Γ0, `:C, h = h0, (` 7→ objC{. . .}
−→e ), and Ψ = Ψ0 ? (` 7→ H).
Since Ψ  Ψ′, it follows that Ψ′ = Ψ′0 ? (` 7→ H ′) such that H ⊆ H ′
and Ψ0  Ψ′0. Thus, by inductive hypothesis one can derive
`hist h0 : (Γ0; Ψ′0) −→e ⊆ H ′ (28)`hist h : (Γ;Ψ′)
Lemma 3 (Stepwise Subject Reduction). Assume that
Γ ` ψ : (Ψ;−→Fr ) (59)
Γ ` I : (Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ′′.(Ψ′′;−→Fr ′′; τ) (60)
both hold and assume that all methods in Dom(methodbody), are well-typed.
If ψ, I ψ′, I ′ holds then there exists Γ′, Ψ′, −→Fr ′, and σ : θ → −→e such that
Γ′ ` ψ′ : (Ψ′;−→Fr ′) holds and Γ′ ` I ′ : (Ψ′;−→Fr ′)( ∃Γ′′.(σ(Ψ′′);σ(−→Fr ′′);σ(τ))
holds.
Proof. Proof is by induction on the derivation of the judgment ψ, I ψ′, I ′.
To make the proof more tractable, in what follows we make the simplifying
assumption that weakening rule 52 does not appear in the derivation of
judgment 60. Similar logic to that presented below applies to cases where
rule 52 is present.
Case 1: ψ, ldc.i4 i4 ψ, i4. Then Γ′′ = · and (Ψ′′;−→Fr ′′; τ) = (Ψ;−→Fr ; int32)
by 36. To satisfy the lemma, choose Γ′ = Γ, Ψ′ = Ψ, −→Fr ′ = −→Fr , and
σ = · and apply typing rule 54.
Case 2: ψ,E[I0] ψ′, E[I ′0]. Let D be a derivation of 60. Observe that
for all possible E[I0], derivation D includes a subderivation D2 of
Γ ` I0 : (Ψ;−→Fr ) ( ∃Γ′2.(Ψ′2;−→Fr
′
2; τ2). By inductive hypothesis, there
exists Γ′, Ψ′, −→Fr ′, and σ such that Γ′ ` ψ′ : (Ψ′;−→Fr ′) and Γ′ `
I ′0 : (Ψ′;
−→Fr ′) ( ∃Γ′2.(σ(Ψ′2);σ(−→Fr
′
2);σ(τ2)). Let D′2 be a derivation
of this latter judgment. Then derivation D can be modified by re-
placing subderivation D2 with derivation D′2 to obtain a derivation of
Γ′ ` E[I ′0] : (Ψ′;−→Fr
′
)( ∃Γ′′.(σ(Ψ′′);σ(−→Fr ′′);σ(τ)).
Case 3: ψ, i4 I2 I3 cond ψ, Ij where j ∈ {2, 3}. Any derivation of 60
contains a subderivation of Γ ` Ij : (Ψ;−→Fr ) ( ∃Γ′′.(Ψ′′;−→Fr ′′; τ) (by
37 and 54). Thus the lemma is satisfied by choosing Γ′ = Γ, Ψ′ = Ψ,−→Fr ′ = −→Fr , and σ = ·.
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Case 4: ψ, I1 I2 while ψ, I1 (I2; (I1 I2 while)) 0 cond. Any derivation
of 60 must have the form
Γ ` I1 : (Ψ;−→Fr )(
∃Γ1.(Ψ1;−→Fr 1; int32)
Γ ` I2 : (Ψ1;−→Fr 1)(
∃Γ2.(Ψ;−→Fr ;void)
Γ ` 0 : (Ψ1;−→Fr 1)(
∃Γ2.(Ψ;−→Fr ;void) (37)
Γ ` I1 I2 0 cond : (Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ′′.(Ψ;−→Fr ;void)
(38)
Γ ` I1 I2 while : (Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ′′.(Ψ;−→Fr ;void)
where Γ = Γ0,Γ′′ and Γ′′ = Γ1,Γ2. One can therefore derive
Γ ` I1 :
(Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ1.
(Ψ1;
−→Fr 1; int32) (52)
Γ ` I1 :
(Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ′′.
(Ψ1;
−→Fr 1; int32)
Γ ` I2 :
(Ψ1;
−→Fr 1)(
∃Γ2.(Ψ;−→Fr ;void) (52)
Γ ` I2 :
(Ψ1;
−→Fr 1)(
∃Γ′′.(Ψ;−→Fr ;void)
Γ ` I1 I2 while :
(Ψ;−→Fr )(
∃Γ′′.(Ψ;−→Fr ;void)
(38)
Γ ` I2; (I1 I2 while) :
(Ψ1;
−→Fr 1)( ∃Γ′′.(Ψ;−→Fr ;void)
Γ ` 0 :
(Ψ1;
−→Fr 1)(
∃Γ2.(Ψ;−→Fr ;void) (52)
Γ ` 0 :
(Ψ1;
−→Fr 1)(
∃Γ′′.(Ψ;−→Fr ;void)
(37)
Γ0,Γ
′′ ` I1 (I2; (I1 I2 while)) 0 cond : (Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ′′.(Ψ;−→Fr ;void)
The lemma is thus satisfied by choosing Γ′ = Γ, Ψ′ = Ψ, −→Fr ′ = −→Fr ,
and σ = ·.
Case 5: ψ, v; I2 ψ, I2. Any derivation of 60 contains a subderivation of
Γ ` I2 : (Ψ;−→Fr )( ∃Γ′′.(Ψ′′;−→Fr ′′; τ) (by 39 and 53). Thus the lemma
is satisfied by choosing Γ′ = Γ, Ψ′ = Ψ, −→Fr ′ = −→Fr , and σ = ·.
Case 6: ψ, ldarg j ψ, vj where ψ = (h, s(v0, . . . , vn)). From 60 and 42,−→Fr has the form −→Fr 0Fr and 0 ≤ j ≤ n. From 59 and 34, Fr =
(τ0, . . . , τn) and Γ ` vj : (Ψ;−→Fr ) ( (Ψ;−→Fr ; τj) holds. The lemma is
therefore satisfied by choosing Γ′ = Γ, Ψ′ = Ψ, −→Fr ′ = −→Fr , and σ = ·.
Case 7: (h, s), v starg j (h, s′), 0 where s = s0(v0, . . . , vn) for some
stack prefix s0, and s′ = s0(v0, . . . , vj−1, v, vj+1, . . . , vn). From
60 and 43, −→Fr has the form −→Fr 0Fr , and 0 ≤ j ≤ n. From 59
and 34, Fr = (τ0, . . . , τn). From 60 and 43, Γ′′ = ·, Ψ′′ = Ψ,−→Fr ′′ = −→Fr 0(τ0, . . . , τj−1, τ ′, τj+1, . . . , τn), τ = void, and Γ ` v :
(Ψ;−→Fr ) ( (Ψ;−→Fr ; τ ′) holds. Choose Γ′ = Γ, Ψ′ = Ψ, −→Fr ′ = −→Fr ′′,
and σ = ·. Since all type judgments for value expressions are inde-
pendent of frames, one can derive Γ ` v : (Ψ′;−→Fr ′) ( (Ψ′;−→Fr ′; τ ′)
to prove by 34 that Γ′ ` (h; s′) : (Ψ′;−→Fr ′) holds. Furthermore,
Γ′ ` 0 : (Ψ′;−→Fr ′)( (Ψ′′;−→Fr ′′; τ) holds by 53, satisfying the lemma.
Case 8: (h, s), v1 . . . vn newobj C(µ1, . . . , µn) (h′, s), ` where h′ =
h, (` 7→ objC{fi = vi|i ∈ 1..n}) and n = fields(C). From 60 and 44,
Γ′′ = `:C, Ψ′′ = Ψ ? (` 7→ ), −→Fr ′′ = −→Fr , and τ = C〈`〉. Additionally,
Γ ` vi : (Ψ;−→Fr ) ( (Ψ;−→Fr ;field(C, fi)) ∀i ∈ 1..n. Choose Γ′ = Γ′′,
Ψ′ = Ψ′′, −→Fr ′ = −→Fr ′′, and σ = ·. From 59 one can derive
Γ′ `heap h : Γ Γ′ ` vi : (Ψ;−→Fr )( (Ψ;−→Fr ;field(C, fi)) ∀i ∈ 1..n(24)
Γ′ `heap h′ : Γ′
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and derive
`hist h : (Γ′; Ψ)  ⊆ (24)`hist h′ : (Γ′; Ψ′)
Thus Γ′ ` (h′, s) : (Ψ′,−→Fr ′) holds. Further, observe that Γ′ ` ` :
(Ψ′;−→Fr ′)( ∃Γ′′.(Ψ′′;Fr ′′;C〈`〉) holds by 55 because Γ′ = Γ, `:C. Thus
the lemma is satisfied.
Case 9: (h, s), v0 . . . vn callvirt C::m.Sig (h, sa), I0 ret where a =
(v0, . . . , vn) and I0 = methodbody(C::m.Sig). From 60 and 45,
−→Fr ′′ =−→Fr , and there exists (Ψin , (τ0, . . . , τn)), Ψout , Ψunused , and Frout such
that Ψ = Ψunused ?Ψin , Ψ′′ = Ψunused ?Ψout ,
Γ ` vi : (Ψ;−→Fr )( (Ψ;−→Fr ; τi) ∀i ∈ 0..n (61)
and
Γ ` Sig <: (Ψin ; (τ0, . . . , τn))( ∃Γ′′.(Ψout ;Frout ; τ).
Since C::m.Sig is well-typed, it follows that
Γ ` I0 : (Ψin ; (τ0, . . . , τn))( ∃Γ′′.(Ψout ;Frout ; τ).
By context widening, this implies that
Γ ` I0 : (Ψunused ?Ψin ;−→Fr (τ0, . . . , τn))(
∃Γ′′.(Ψunused ?Ψout ;−→Fr Frout ; τ)
which collapses to
Γ ` I0 : (Ψ;−→Fr (τ0, . . . , τn))( ∃Γ′′.(Ψ′′;−→Fr Frout ; τ).
Choose Γ′ = Γ, Ψ′ = Ψ, −→Fr ′ = −→Fr (τ0, . . . , τn), and σ = ·. To prove
that Γ′ ` I ′ : (Ψ′;−→Fr ′)( ∃Γ′′.(Ψ′′;−→Fr ′′; τ) holds, derive
Γ ` I0 : (Ψ;−→Fr (τ0, . . . , τn))( ∃Γ′′.(Ψ′′;−→Fr Frout ; τ)(58)
Γ ` I0 ret : (Ψ;−→Fr (τ0, . . . , τn))( ∃Γ′′.(Ψ′′;−→Fr ; τ)
(recalling that −→Fr ′′ = −→Fr ). To prove that Γ′ ` (h; sa) : (Ψ′;−→Fr ′) holds,
observe that Γ `stack s : −→Fr holds by 59, and therefore one can derive
Γ `stack s : −→Fr Γ ` vi : (Ψ;−→Fr )( (Ψ;−→Fr ; τi) ∀i ∈ 0..n(34)
Γ′ `stack sa : −→Fr ′
by 61 and 34.
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Case 10: (h, sa), v ret (h, s), v. By 60 and 58, Γ′′ = ·, Ψ = Ψ′′, and
−→Fr = −→Fr ′′Fr0 for some Fr0. Choose Γ′ = Γ, Ψ′ = Ψ′′, −→Fr ′ = −→Fr ′′, and
σ = ·. Any derivation of 60 has a subderivation of Γ ` v : (Ψ;−→Fr )(
(Ψ;−→Fr ; τ). Since the typing rules for value expressions are independant
of frame, one can therefore derive Γ ` v : (Ψ′;−→Fr ′) ( (Ψ′′;−→Fr ′′; τ).
Furthermore, one derivation of 59 has a subderivation of
Γ `stack s : −→Fr ′′
...
(34)
Γ `stack sa : −→Fr ′′Fr0
Hence Γ′ `stack s : −→Fr ′ holds.
Case 11: (h, s), ` ldfld µ C::f (h, s), v where h(`) = objC{. . . , f =
v, . . .}−→e . By 60 and 40, Γ′′ = ·, Ψ = Ψ′′, and −→Fr = −→Fr ′′.
Choose Γ′ = Γ, Ψ′ = Ψ, −→Fr ′ = −→Fr , and σ = ·. Any deriva-
tion of 60 has a subderivation of Γ ` v : (Ψ;−→Fr ) ( (Ψ;−→Fr ; τ).
Hence Γ ` v : (Ψ′;−→Fr ′) ( (Ψ′′;−→Fr ′′; τ) holds. Furthermore,
Γ′ ` (h; s) : (Ψ′;−→Fr ′) holds by 59.
Case 12: (h, s), ` v stfld µ C::fj (h′, s), 0 where h′ = h[` 7→ objC [fj 7→
v]], and 1 ≤ j ≤ fields(C), and h(`) = objC{fi = vi|i ∈ 1..fields(C)}
−→e .
By 60 and 41, Γ′′ = ·, Ψ = Ψ′′, −→Fr = −→Fr ′′, and τ = void. Choose
Γ′ = Γ, Ψ′ = Ψ, −→Fr ′ = −→Fr , and σ = ·. Observe that Γ′ ` 0 :
(Ψ′;−→Fr ′) ( (Ψ′′;−→Fr ′′; τ) holds by rule 53. Furthermore, since one
derivation of 59 has a subderivation of
Γ `heap h0 : Γ0
Γ ` vi : (Ψ;−→Fr )( (Ψ;−→Fr ;field(C, fi)) ∀i ∈ 1..fields(C)(24)
Γ `heap h : Γ
where Γ = Γ0, `:C and h = h0, (` 7→ objC{. . .}
−→e ), and since 60 implies
that all three of Γ ` v : (Ψ;−→Fr ) ( (Ψ;−→Fr ;µ), field(C, fj) = µ, and
` ∈ Dom(Γ′) hold, one can derive
Γ `heap h0 : Γ0
Γ ` v : (Ψ;−→Fr )( (Ψ;−→Fr ;field(C, fj))
Γ ` vi : (Ψ;−→Fr )( (Ψ;−→Fr ;field(C, fi)) ∀i ∈ 1..j − 1, j + 1..fields(C)(24)
Γ′ `heap h′ : Γ′
Hence Γ′ ` (h′; s) : (Ψ′;−→Fr ′) holds.
Case 13: (h, s), ` evt e1 (h′, s), 0 where h′ = h[` 7→ objC{. . .}
−→e e1 and
h(`) = objC{. . .}
−→e . By 60 and 46, Γ′′ = ·, −→Fr = −→Fr ′′, τ = void,
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Ψ = Ψ1 ? (` 7→ H) for some Ψ1 and H, and Ψ′′ = Ψ1 ? (` 7→ He1).
Choose Γ′ = Γ, Ψ′ = Ψ′′, −→Fr ′ = −→Fr , and σ = ·. Then Γ′ ` 0 :
(Ψ′;−→Fr ′) ( (Ψ′′;−→Fr ′′; τ) holds by typing rule 53. Furthermore, since
one derivation of 59 has a subderivation of
`hist h0 : (Γ0; Ψ1) −→e ⊆ H (28)`hist h : (Γ;Ψ)
where Γ = Γ0, `:C and h = h0, ` 7→ objC{. . .}
−→e , one can derive
`hist h0 : (Γ0; Ψ1) −→e e1 ⊆ He1 (28)`hist h′ : (Γ;Ψ′′)
Hence Γ′ ` (h′; s) : (Ψ′;−→Fr ′) holds.
Case 14: (h, s),newpackage C (h′, s), ` where h′ = h, ` 7→ pkg(·). By
60 and 47, Γ′′ = `:C〈?〉, Ψ = Ψ′′, −→Fr = −→Fr ′′, and τ = C〈?〉. Choose
Γ′ = Γ,Γ′′, Ψ′ = Ψ, −→Fr ′ = −→Fr , and σ = ·. Observe that Γ′ ` ` :
(Ψ′′;−→Fr ′′)( (Ψ′′;−→Fr ′′; τ) by typing rule 56. Hence Γ′ ` ` : (Ψ′;−→Fr ′)(
∃Γ′′.(Ψ′′;−→Fr ′′; τ) holds by rule 52. In addition, any derivation of 59
includes subderivations of Γ `heap h : Γ and `hist h : (Γ;Ψ); hence one
can derive
Γ′ `heap h : Γ (25)
Γ′ `heap h′ : Γ′
and `hist h : (Γ;Ψ) (31)`hist h′ : (Γ′; Ψ′)
Thus Γ′ ` (h′; s) : (Ψ′;−→Fr ′) holds, proving the lemma.
Case 15: ` `′ rep
C
(H) pack (h′, s), 0 where h(`) = pkg(. . .) and h′ =
h[` 7→ pkg(`′, rep
C
(H))]. By 60 and 48, Γ′′ = ·, −→Fr = −→Fr ′′, τ =
void, and Ψ = Ψ′′ ? (` 7→ H ′) for some H ′. Any derivation of 60 has
subderivations of Γ ` rep
C
(H) : (Ψ;−→Fr )( (Ψ′′;−→Fr ;Rep
C
〈H〉) (by rule
57) such that H ′ ⊆ H ⊆ policy(C) (by rule 48), and of
Ψ = Ψ′′ ? (`′ 7→ H ′)
(55)
Γ ` `′ : (Ψ;−→Fr )( (Ψ;−→Fr ;C〈`〉)
where Γ = Γ0, `:C〈?〉, `′:C. One derivation of 59 has a subderivation
of
D
`hist h0, (` 7→ pkg(. . .)) : (Γ0, `:C〈?〉; Ψ′′) −→e ⊆ H ′ (28)`hist h : (Γ;Ψ)
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where h = h0, (` 7→ pkg(. . .)), (`′ 7→ objC{. . .}
−→e ) (because rule 28
is the only derivation rule that can add `′ 7→ H ′ to Ψ.) Given the
definition of h0 above, observe that
h′ = h0, (` 7→ pkg(`′, repC(H))), (`′ 7→ objC{. . .}
−→e )
and −→e ⊆ H ′ ⊆ H ⊆ policy(C). Choose Γ′ = Γ, Ψ′ = Ψ′′, −→Fr ′ = −→Fr ,
and σ = ·. Observe that Γ′ ` 0 : (Ψ′;−→Fr ′)( (Ψ′′;−→Fr ′′; τ) is derivable
using rule 53.
It remains to be shown that `hist h′ : (Γ′; Ψ′) holds. To prove this,
it suffices to prove that `hist h0 : (Γ0; Ψ′′) holds, since if this latter
judgment holds, one can derive
`hist h0 : (Γ0; Ψ′′) −→e ⊆ H ⊆ policy(C)(29)`hist h′ : (Γ;Ψ′′)
Suppose h(`) = pkg(·). Then
D = `hist h0 : (Γ0; Ψ
′′)
(31)`hist h0, (` 7→ pkg(·)) : (Γ0, `:C〈?〉; Ψ′′)
proving that `hist h0 : (Γ0; Ψ′′) holds.
Otherwise h(`) = pkg(`′′, rep
C
(H ′′)) for some `′′ and H ′′. In that case,
D = `hist h1 : (Γ1; Ψ
′′)
−→
e′′ ⊆ H ′′ ⊆ policy(C)
(29)`hist h0, (` 7→ pkg(`′′, repC(H ′′))) : (Γ0, `:C〈?〉; Ψ′′)
where Γ0 = Γ1, (`′′:C) and h0 = h1, (`′′ 7→ objC{. . .}
−→
e′′). One can
therefore derive
`hist h1 : (Γ1; Ψ′′)
−→
e′′ ⊆ policy(C)
(30)`hist h0 : (Γ0; Ψ′′)
proving that `hist h0 : (Γ0; Ψ′′) holds.
Case 16: (h, s(v0, . . . , vn)), ` unpack j (h[` 7→ pkg(·)], sa′), `′ where
h(`) = pkg(`′, rep
C
(H)) and a′ = (v0, . . . , vj−1, repC(H), vj+1, . . . , vn).
By 60 and 51, Γ′′ = `:C, θ, Ψ′′ = Ψ ? (` 7→ θ), τ = C〈`〉, and −→Fr ′′ =−→Fr 0(τ0, . . . , τj−1,RepC〈θ〉, τj+1, . . . , τn) where
−→Fr = −→Fr 0(τ0, . . . , τn).
One derivation of 59 has a subderivation of
`hist h0 : (Γ0; Ψ) −→e ⊆ H ⊆ policy(C)(29)`hist h : (Γ;Ψ)
36
where Γ = Γ0, `:C〈?〉, `′:C and h = h0, (` 7→ pkg(`′, repC(H))), (`′ 7→
objC{. . .}
−→e ).
Choose Γ′ = Γ, σ = (θ 7→ −→e ), Ψ′ = σ(Ψ′′), and −→Fr ′ = σ(−→Fr ′′). Since
θ 6∈ Dom(Γ) (by rule 49), it follows that σ(Ψ′′) = Ψ ? (` 7→ −→e ). One
can therefore derive
Ψ′ = Ψ ? (` 7→ −→e )
(55)
Γ′ ` `′ : (Ψ′;−→Fr ′)( (σ(Ψ′′);σ(−→Fr ′′);σ(τ))
and one can derive
`hist h0 : (Γ0; Ψ) (31)`hist h0, (` 7→ pkg(·)) : (Γ0, `:C〈?〉; Ψ) −→e ⊆ −→e (28)`hist h′ : (Γ′; Ψ′)
Finally, since any derivation of 59 has a subderivation of
Γ `stack s : −→Fr 0 Γ ` vi : (Ψ;−→Fr )( (Ψ;−→Fr ; τi) ∀i ∈ 0..n(34)
Γ `stack s(v0, . . . , vn) : −→Fr 0(τ0, . . . , τn)
and since Γ ` rep
C
(H) : (Ψ′;−→Fr ′)( (Ψ′;−→Fr ′;Rep
C
〈H〉) holds by typ-
ing rule 57, it follows from derivation rule 34 that Γ′ `stack sa′ : −→Fr ′
holds.
Case 17: ψ, rep
C
(H) I2 I3 condst C, k ψ, Ij where j ∈ {2, 3}. Choose
Γ′ = Γ, −→Fr ′ = −→Fr ,
Ψ′ =
{
ctx+C,k(H,Ψ) if j = 2
ctx−C,k(H,Ψ) if j = 3
and σ = ·. By 60, 51, and 57, both Γ ` I2 : (ctx+C,k;
−→Fr ) (
∃Γ′′.(Ψ′′;−→Fr ′′; τ) and Γ ` I3 : (ctx−C,k;
−→Fr )( ∃Γ′′.(Ψ′′;−→Fr ′′; τ) hold, so
Γ ` Ij : (Ψ′;−→Fr ′)( ∃Γ′′.(Ψ′′;−→Fr ′′; τ) holds.
Any derivation of 59 has subderivations of Γ `heap h : Γ and `hist
h : (Γ;Ψ). To prove that Γ′ ` ψ : (Ψ′;−→Fr ′), it suffices to show that
`hist h : (Γ;Ψ′). If j = 2 then testC,k(repC(H)) 6= 0 (by 17), and
axiom 20 therefore implies that Ψ  ctx+C,k(H,Ψ). Altnernatively, if
j = 3 then testC,k(repC(H)) = 0, and axiom 19 therefore implies that
Ψ  ctx−C,k(H,Ψ). In either case, Ψ  Ψ′ holds. By context subtyping,
we conclude that `hist h : (Γ;Ψ′) also holds.
Case 18: ψ, v1 . . . vn newhist C, k ψ, hcC,k(v1, . . . , vn). By 60 and 51,
Γ′′ = ·, Ψ = Ψ′′, −→Fr = −→Fr ′′, and τ = HCC,k(RepC1〈H1〉, . . . ,RepCn〈Hn〉)
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where Γ ` vi : (Ψ;−→Fr ) ( (Ψ;−→Fr ;RepCi〈Hi〉) holds for all i ∈ 1..n.
Choose Γ′ = Γ, Ψ′ = Ψ, −→Fr ′ = −→Fr , and σ = ·. By axioms 21 and
22, there exists H such that τ = Rep
C
〈H〉 and hcC,k(v1, . . . , vn) =
rep
C
(H). Thus, Γ ` rep
C
(H) : (Ψ′;−→Fr ′) ( (Ψ′′;−→Fr ′′;Rep
C
〈H〉) holds
by typing rule 57.
Theorem 3 (Subject Reduction). Assume that Γ ` ψ : (Ψ;−→Fr ) holds and
assume that all methods in Dom(methodbody) are well-typed. If Γ ` I :
(Ψ;−→Fr ) ( ∃Γ′′.(Ψ′′;−→Fr ′′; τ) holds and ψ, I n ψ′, I ′ holds then there exist
Γ′, Ψ′, −→Fr ′, and σ : θ → −→e such that Γ′ ` ψ′ : (Ψ′;−→Fr ′) holds and Γ′ ` I ′ :
(Ψ′;Fr ′)( (σ(Ψ′′);σ(Fr ′′);σ(τ)) holds.
Proof. Proof is by induction on n.
Base Case: Assume n = 0. Choose Γ′ = Γ, Ψ′ = Ψ, −→Fr ′ = −→Fr , and σ = ·.
The theorem is then satisfied by assumption.
Inductive Case: Assume n ≥ 1. Since ψ, I n ψ′, I ′ holds, there ex-
ist ψ1 and I1 such that ψ, I n−1 ψ1, I1 holds and such that
ψ1, I1 ψ′, I ′ also holds. By inductive hypothesis, there ex-
ists Γ1, Ψ1,
−→Fr 1, and σ1 such that Γ1 ` ψ1 : (Ψ1;−→Fr 1) and
Γ1 ` I1 : (Ψ1;−→Fr 1) ( (σ1(Ψ′′);σ1(−→Fr ′′);σ1(τ)) hold. The theo-
rem then follows from the stepwise subject reduction lemma.
B.3 Progress
Theorem 4 (Progress). Assume Γ ` I : (Ψ;−→Fr ) ( (Ψ′;−→Fr ′; τ) and Γ `
(h; s) : (Ψ;−→Fr ) hold. Then one of the following conditions holds:
1. I = v for some value v.
2. There exists a small-step store ψ′ and instruction I ′ such that
(h, s), I ψ′, I ′.
3. I = E
[
` unpack j
]
and h(`) = pkg(·).
Proof. If I is a value, then condition 1 of the theorem holds immediately,
proving the theorem. Assume I is not a value. Then I must have one of the
following forms:
Case 1: I = E[ldc.i4 i4 ]. Condition 2 holds with I ′ = E[i4 ] and ψ′ =
(h, s).
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Case 2: I = E[v1; I2]. Condition 2 holds with I ′ = E[I2] and ψ′ = (h, s).
Case 3: I = E[v I2 I3 cond]. By typing rule 37, v = i4 for some integer
i4 . Thus, condition 2 holds with I ′ = E[Ij ] and ψ′ = (h, s), where
j =
{
3 if i4 = 0
2 otherwise
Case 4: I = E[I1 I2 while]. Condition 2 holds with
I ′ = E[I1 (I2; (I1 I2 while)) 0 cond]
and ψ′ = (h, s).
Case 5: I = E[ldarg j]. By typing rule 42, −→Fr = −→Fr 0(τ0, . . . , τn) and
0 ≤ j ≤ n. Since Γ `stack s : −→Fr , it follows from derivation rule 34
that s = s0(v0, . . . , vn). Hence, condition 2 holds with I ′ = E[vj ] and
ψ′ = (h, s).
Case 6: I = E[v′ starg j]. By typing rule 43, −→Fr = −→Fr 0(τ0, . . . , τn) and
0 ≤ j ≤ n. Since Γ `stack s : −→Fr , it follows from derivation rule 34
that s = s0(v0, . . . , vn). Hence, condition 2 holds with I ′ = E[0] and
ψ′ = (h, s0(v0, . . . , vj−1, v′, vj+1, . . . , vn)).
Case 7: I = E[v1 . . . vn newobj C(µ1, . . . , µn)]. Typing rule 44 implies
that n = fields(C). Condition therefore 2 holds with I ′ = E[`] and
ψ′ = (h[` 7→ objC{fi 7→ vi|i ∈ 1..n}], s).
Case 8: I = E[v0 . . . vn callvirt C::m.Sig ]. By typing rule 45, there
exists I0 such that methodbody(C::m.Sig) = I0. Hence, condition 2
holds with I ′ = E[I0 ret] and ψ′ = (h, s(v0, . . . , vn)).
Case 9: I = E[v ldfld µ C::f ]. By typing rule 40, v = ` such that Γ `
` : (Ψ;−→Fr )( (Ψ;−→Fr ;C〈`〉) holds. Since Γ `heap h : Γ holds, it follows
from derivation rule 24 that h(`) = objC{. . . , f = v, . . .}
−→e for some
value v. Hence, condition 2 holds with I = E[v] and ψ′ = (h, s).
Case 10: I = E[v v′ stfld µ C::f ]. By typing rule 41, v = ` such that
Γ ` ` : (Ψ;−→Fr ) ( (Ψ;−→Fr ;C〈`〉) holds. Since Γ `heap h : Γ holds, it
follows from derivation rule 24 that h(`) = objC{. . . , f = v, . . .}
−→e for
some value v. Hence, condition 2 holds with I = E[0] and ψ′ = (h[` 7→
objC [f 7→ v′]], s).
Case 11: I = E[v evt e1]. By typing rule 46, v = ` such that Γ ` ` :
(Ψ;−→Fr )( (Ψ;−→Fr ;C〈`〉) holds. Since Γ `heap h : Γ holds, it follows from
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derivation rule 24 that h(`) = objC{. . .}
−→e for some event sequence −→e .
Thus, condition 2 of the theorem holds with I ′ = E[0] and ψ′ = (h[` 7→
objC{. . .}
−→e e1 , s).
Case 12: I = E[newpackage C]. Choose ` 6∈ Dom(h). Condition 2 holds
with I ′ = E[`] and ψ′ = ((h, (` 7→ pkg(·))), s).
Case 13: I = E[v v′ v′′ pack]. By typing rule 46, v = ` such that Γ `
` : (Ψ;−→Fr ) ( (Ψ;−→Fr ;C〈?〉) holds, v′ = `′ for some heap pointer `′,
and v′′ = rep
C
(H) for some history abstraction H. Since Γ `heap h : Γ
holds, it follows from derivation rule 25 that h(`) = pkg(. . .). Hence,
condition 2 of the theorem holds with I ′ = E[0] and ψ′ = (h[` 7→
pkg(`′, rep
C
(H))], s).
Case 14: I = E[v unpack j]. By typing rule 49, v = ` such that Γ `
` : (Ψ;−→Fr ) ( (Ψ;−→Fr ;C〈?〉) holds, and −→Fr = −→Fr 0(τ0, . . . , τn) where
0 ≤ j ≤ n. Since Γ `stack s : −→Fr , it follows from derivation rule
34 that s = s0(v0, . . . , vn). Since Γ `heap h : Γ, it follows from
derivation rule 25 that h(`) = pkg(. . .). If h(`) = pkg(`′, v), then
condition 2 of the theorem holds with I = E[`′] and ψ′ = (h[` 7→
pkg(·)], s0(v0, . . . , vj−1, v, vj+1, . . . , vn)). Otherwise h(`) = pkg(·) and
therefore condition 3 of the theorem holds.
Case 15: I = E[v I2 I3 condst k]. By typing rule 50, v = repC(H) for
some class C and history abstraction H. Condition 2 therefore holds
with
I ′ =
{
E[I3] if testk(C, repC(H)) = 0
E[I2] otherwise
and ψ′ = (h, s).
Case 16: I = E[v1 . . . vn newhist k]. By typing rule 51, arity(HC k) = n.
By axiom 22, it therefore follows that arity(hck) = n. Condition 2 of
the theorem statement therefore holds with I ′ = E[hck(v1, . . . , vn)]
and ψ′ = (h, s).
B.4 Policy Adherence
The proof of Terminating Policy Adherence (Theorem 1) is as follows.
Proof. By subject reduction, there exists Γ′, Ψ′, −→Fr ′, and σ such that Γ′ `
v : (Ψ′;Fr ′)( (σ(Ψout);σ(Frout);σ(τout)) and Γ′ ` (h′; s′) : (Ψ′;Fr ′) hold.
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From the typing rules for value expressions, we know that Ψ′ = σ(Ψout) and
Fr ′ = σ(Frout). Thus
Γ′ ` (h′; s′) : (σ(Ψout);σ(Frout);σ(v)) (62)
holds.
Let ` and −→e be given such that h′(`) = objC{. . .}
−→e . If ` ∈ Dom(Ψout)
then there exists a derivation of 62 with a subderivation of
... −→e ⊆ σ(Ψout(`))(28)`hist h′ : (Γ′; Ψ′)
Since σ(Ψout(`)) ⊆ policy(C) by assumption, we conclude that −→e ⊆
policy(C). If instead ` 6∈ Dom(Ψout), then there exists a derivation of 62
with either a subderivation of
... −→e ⊆ · · · ⊆ policy(C)
(29)`hist h′ : (Γ′; Ψ′)
or a subderivation of
... −→e ⊆ policy(C)
(30)`hist h′ : (Γ′; Ψ′)
In either case, we conclude that −→e ⊆ policy(C), satsifying the theorem.
The proof of Non-terminating Prefix Adherence (Theorem 2) is as fol-
lows.
Proof. Proof is by induction on n.
Base Case: If n = 0 then h′ = h and the theorem holds by assumption.
Inductive Case: If n ≥ 1 then there exists h1, s1, and I1 such that
(h, s), I n−1(h1, s1), I1 holds and (h1, s1), I1 (h′, s′), I ′ holds. By
inductive hypothesis, h1 is prefix-adherent. By subject reduction,
there also exists Γ1, Ψ1, Fr1, and σ such that Γ1 ` I1 : (Ψ1;Fr1) (
(σ(Ψ′);σ(−→Fr ′);σ(τ)) and Γ1 ` (h1; s1) : (Ψ1;−→Fr 1) hold.
Suppose I1 = E[v1 . . . vn newobj C(µ1, . . . , µm)]. Then h′ = h, (` 7→
objC{. . .}). Typing rule 44 implies that  ∈ pre(policy(C)). Since h
is prefix-adherent, we conclude that h′ is also prefix-adherent.
Suppose I1 = E[` evt e1]. Then h and h′ are identical except for
the event history of class object h(`) = objC{. . .}
−→e . Typing rule 46
implies that Ψ1(`)e1 ⊆ pre(policy(C)). Since ` ∈ Dom(Ψ1) there exists
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a derivation of Γ1 ` (h1; s1) : (Ψ1;−→Fr 1) that includes a subderivation
of
... −→e ⊆ Ψ1(`)(28)`hist (h1; s1) : (Γ1; Ψ1)
Thus, −→e e1 ⊆ pre(policy(C)), and we conclude that h′ is prefix-
adherent.
If I1 has any other form, then h and h′ are identical with respect to
the event histories of their class objects. Since h is prefix-adherent by
assumption, it follows that h′ is prefix-adherent.
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